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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
;! at u re of t Ii e Case 
Ronald Lee Maci'< appeals from the dismissal of his Successive 
Post-Conviction, Fourth District Case tlo. CV-PC-2013-026~Ll, filed February 12, 
?OJ 3, and Di smi sserl vJith Fina 1 ,Judgement, flay 14, 2013. 
Statement of the Facts 
Mr. r1aci1< disputes the factual findings of the state courts in this case, 
and in all related cases assigned to the Appellant. (See: Course of the 
Proceedings, helow). 
r1r. naci 1< has anci does assert an /\ctual/Factual Innocence claim. He also 
has anrl coes state a fereral claim pursuant to the 5th; '3th; anci ltlth 
nmenrment's to the United States Constitution. (See: Issues anr Argument below). 
T'lis is a fourtythree year olc murcier case and conviction. 11aci'< v1as 
sentenced 11ithout a trial after pleading r:;uilty to First Degree flurder and vJas 
sentencer to life in prison, on September 1~, 1972. 
On August 10th, 1971 Ronalc' Lee Macik v1as incarcerated at the old Idaho 
State Pen along 1Jith co-defendants Danny R. P011ers and \!illiam L Burt, and the 
deceased so called murder victim 1/illiam Henry Butler. Macik was doing time on 
a 1969 robbery conviction. The conditions within the prison were deplorable, and 
the guarcls 1·1ere untrained and treatment and care of prisoner's would amount to 
cruel and unusual punishment using any standard. On /\ugust 10, 1971 tl1e 
prisomer's rioted. The day of the riot it was 112 degrees inside the cellblocks, 
1-1hich had poor if any ventilation. The laundry had broken dovm leaving 
prisoner's to suffer in filth, heat, and hopelessness. 
Early in the riot Macik hac1 to stab another prisoner, Charles Rice to 
protect himself. Macik was charged with Attempted murder for this on August 23, 
1971. Those charoes vJere rismissed September 29, 1972. The prisoner's were not 
1 
segregated or separated from other violent predators. William Henry Butler was a 
documented Sodomite. An institutional predator of the worse degree. Both prior 
to and during the riot, 'Bill Butler' preyed upon numerous other prisoner's. The 
boiling point for those other prisoners VJas, when during the riot, the than Ada 
County Prosecutor, James E. Risch, Esq.; Ada County Sheriff, Paul W. Bright; and 
\Jarden Randall Mays, v1ent to the prison and lilade the Sodomite Bill Butler, 
their 'Inmate Representative' to discuss issues surrounding the riot and 
conditions within the prison. 
The official's approval of Bill Butler, and promotion to spokesman, only 
emboldened his behavior and created more fear and hopelessness, altogether, 
misery within the broiling prison. As anyone can understand! 
When the Appellant, Ronald Lee Macik was accosted by the Sodomite on August 
14, 1971, Macik went with Hilliam Henry Butler to the gymnasium Boxing Ring 
area, where there was a shower area 'Bill Butler' often used in his 
effectuations toward sodomizing the prison populace. There waiting for the 
Sodomite vJas a number of pri saner' s. Some, friends of others v1hom had been 
sodomized by Bill Butler, Danny R. Powers, to name one, being a friend of one. 
As the record indicates and the Appellant will point out below, the boxing 
arena and shower area could be closed off, with one door locked with a padlock, 
and the other, vJith a window and curtain, could be locked from the inside. This 
was the case that eavening when an officer vJas alerted by another officer that 
something was going down in the boxing arena area. This officer is Allen White. 
He testified at the only evidentiary process taken in the case. 
PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPTS, DOCKET SC-2742. TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1971 
MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE. PAGE 6; TRANSCRIPT PAGE -13-; RC-OOOO28: 
Questioning by Ada County prosecutor, James E. Risch: Following page: 
Witness is Allen White: 
2 
Q Coulcl you tell us please what occurred when you approached t~e 
boxin0 arena area? 
/1. t!ot'1 i ng. 
Q \/hat clid you observe when you got there? 
I\ \/ell, the door v,as loc'<ec! from t'ie inside, the shade v1as dravm 
over t'1e vdnrov1. I '<nocked on the cioor and rlacik was lool<ing out 
the v11indo1;1. I heard him plainly rer.iar'<, "The screw's here," or, 
""It's the screw," something li'<e that. And I \Jaited for 
approximately two minutes, the door vJas opened, at that time 
Inmate Thornell and a 9roup of say five or six inmates whom I 
can't remember were walkino from the shower area which was not 
(page 7)(RC-00002S), in my -vision -- \vhere I v,as standing, it's 
around the corner -- just walked around the corner and asked me 
what I wanted. Because of the tension in the yard and because at 
that moment I felt there was -- there was something more to --
to t!1is than .;ust plain "souawkie" or pills or something, I told 
tliem that I was 1 oo 1<i ng for Officer Feredat and he told me :~e 
wasn't in there so I left. 
Q t!ow, you referred to an indivirual by the name of nacik. Is he 
present here in the courtroom? 
A Yes, right over by powers here. 
FlHnHrn TESTH10t!Y FROr1 THE PREI.Ir1INARY HEARitlG TRAtlSCRIPT: ( PAGE 47 thru Page 49 
TRAMSCRIPT PPGES -5~ thru -56; RC-000069 to RC-000071): James E. Risch questioning 
Officer Allen Hhite: 
Q At the time you tried it and became aware that it was locked from 
the insire, at that time ric! you '<nm·J anyone else v<Jas insirle 
there? Or anyone was insire there? 
.A t!o, not t 11at particulare time. 
C t/ 11at rir you rlo after you found that it v,as loc'<er from the inside? 
.A \/ell, I 'r of-iviously assumed that someone \las in there but I -- I 
di rn' t '<novJ for sure you know if this was so until rlaci '<, Inmate 
i1aci'<, puller riac'< the curtain and --
Q And that's the curtain that's on the window in the door? 
,~ Yes. Yes. 
Q Had you knocked on the door or banger on it or sairl anything? 
A Yes. Yes, I knocked on the door. 
Q Did you say anything? 
~. tio. 
Q \las it after you knocker. on the cioor that he pulled back the 
curtain? 
A I ~elieve so. 
Q Hhen you looker in and saw him in the winrow, did you see anyone else? 
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A No, I didn't. 
Q Hhat happened then after he pulled the curtain back? 
A He exclaimed, "The screws here," or something similar to that. 
Q And then what happened? 
A I waited for a short time, I'd say approximately a minute, a 
minute and a half, two minutes, something like that, i can't 
recall. He opened the door and from the shower area Thornell and 
a group of five or six inmates came around -- came around toward 
myself. 
Q Now between the time you saw Macik and he made that remark and 
the time the door was opened, did you hear anything in there? 
A I heard muffled conversation. 
TRANSCRIPTS, SUPRA, page 50, Transcripe page -57-; RC-000072: Line 25: 
Q Hhen the door vJas opened, vJhere was Macik standing (page 51; 
T-58-) when the door was opened to the boxing room? 
A Directly on the other side of it. 










I believe so. 
Was there any other person standing around him or ir 
vicinity to him at that time? 
near 
As best as I can recall, I think 
was that let me in, I believe it was 
now, I think they vJere -- they were 
inmates came out of the shower area. 
I think Macik or whoever it 
Macik but I'm not real sure 
by theirself and a group of 
Had you been in the boxing room before they came out of the 
shower area? 
I think I -- I -- they came out the same time I was coming in. 
Did they come out together or one at a time? 
Together. Together. 
And how close did they get to you? 
Well, a few feet. 
Q How long were you in the boxing room? 
A Oh, for as long as it took me to find out that Fereday wasn't --
that nobody had seen Fereday. Like I say, about, oh, minute and a 
half. 
(SEE: PRELIMINARY HEARING TRMJSCRIPTS P,~GES 50 thru 51; Transcript page -57-58-
RC-000072 f 000073). 
The record is clear that Ronald Lee Macik was at the door, both before Officer 
Allen White knacked on the door, and was the one who opened the door, and .was by it! 
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The recorci also indicates that f1aci'< v1as also, no 1·Jhere near the location 
t'1e shovJer area, or t'1e ot'1er side of t:1e boxing arena opposite the door 
r:aci'< was seen hy Officer /\l1en 1/hite standing at vJhen he 'rnoc'<ed on the door.,, 
reading of the officers accounts when they finally found the body of Bill Butler 
clearly shovJs 112 v1as found in a rolled up gym mat on the other side of the 
hoxing arena, opposite t 11e door v1ith t'.1e \JindmJ, near the shov1er, v1here t:1e 
"five or six inmates v1ere coming out of t!1e shower" Mr. t1aci'< not being one of 
t 112m. Maci'< at \Jorst ivas 'v1atching for the scre1-J,' /\t best, a bystander on the 
opposite side of the room from the incident, as the Officer testified to. 
1!011ever, there is clear, colorable, admissible evidence that t1acik had no 
11anci in the r1urcier. Frolil t:1e murderer himself! 
PRELif1INARY HEARING TRANSCRIPTS DOCKET 5C-2742; SUPRA, pages 148 thru 150; 
Transcript pages -154- to -J.56-, and attached here as /\ttachment #5. ENTIRE 
TR/\t!SCRIPT OF PRELH1Hl/\RY HEARitlG ATTACHED /\S /\TT/\Cflf1EMT #6) (RC-000020-000230). 
Questioning by James E. Risch to /\da County Sheriff, Paul Bright: 
Q Sheriff, would you please then reiterate for us the dialogue that 
occurrec' after you turned on the tape recorder, refreshing your 
memory from the notes that you have please? 
A The -- the conversation after? 
Q You turned on the tape recorder, yes. 
~ Do you want this verhatilil? 
Q Yes. 
,~ "This is Paul Bright, Sheriff of Jl.da County. The time is 6:05 on 
September the 2~th, 1971. I'm talking to Danny powers at the Idaho 
State Penitentiary. Danny has requested that I come up and visit 
with him concerning the Dill Butler lilUrder. 
Danny, I have a card here cal led t:1e Miranda 1Jarning 11hich says 
you have a rig'1t to rcr.iain silent, anything you say can and 1cJill 
be used against you in the court of la1,, you i1ave the right to 
talk to a lawyer and have him present with you and if you cannot 
afford it one will be appointed to represent you before any 
questioning if you wish one. Do you understand this Danny? Yes. 
Do you still wish to talk to me at this time? Yes. 
D3.nny, briefly, you said you v1anted to ta H to i7le at the /\da 
County Jail :incl \vould tell me briefly" -- pard::rn -- "and vwuld 
tell me briefly what this concerns? About a murder, about Butler's 
inurder. 
Yes, and what about it? Because I'm the one that done it. 
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You're the one that did it? Yes. 
And this is the thing that you wanted to talk to me about, right? 
Yes. 
And vJhy was it that you did kill Butler? Becasue he was" --
vulgarity word, do you want it included? 
Q Yes, read it right into the record. 
/1. "Because he 1:1as fucking a friend of mine. 
Doing what? Fucking. 
Oh, I see. Then when we're down to the" -- correction. 
"Oh, I see. Then \vhen we're down at the Ada County jail talking 
about this will you give me the name of this individual and 
other pertinent information, right? Right. 
SHERIFF PAUL BRIGHT n THE END OF THE COMVERSATION WITH DAMNY POHERS." 
Q Sheriff, did you again then have occasion to talk v1ith Mr. 
Powers at the Sheriff's office September 25th, 1971? 
A I did. 
Q And where did this take place? 
A In my office at the Ada County Courthouse. 
Q And who was present at that time? 
A There was Detective Rodenbaugh and Detective Hells, Sergant 




And, Sheriff, did you tape this conversation that you had with 
Mr. Pov1ers? 
I did. 
PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPTS, PAGE 148 thru 150; ENTIRE 
TRANSCRIPT ATTACHED AS ATTACHMENT #6)(RC-000020 to 000230) 
Mr. Macik points out that Sheriff Paul Bright tapped and then transcribed 
interrogations of Macik himself on September 25, 1971; of Co-defendant Bill Burt 
al so on September 25, 1971; and of Co-defendant Danny Powers on September 26, 
1971. Macik submitted each of these as exhibits #8; #9; and #10, to each of his 
pleadings, including the present case. (See: Preliminary hearing Transcripts; 
page 154, line's 10-16.) 
Sheriff Paul Bright stated that it 1·1as Pov1ers confession that broke the 
case. (PT-page 199, line 10-11). And that there was no other incriminating 
statment except Powers's in Sheriff's interviews. (PT-page 193, line 13 thru 23). 
f1r. r1acik points out that at various times the Sheriff testifies that he 
taped all conversations v1hile the tape recorder v,as on, and other times he 
testified that there were times it 1·1as not on. (See PRELH1INARY HEARING 
TRANSCRIPTS Pages 165, 166, and page 167: RC-000186; 000187; 000188). 
This is relevant in this case because the Appellant has claimed, and 
maintaines that at one of these interrogation interviews, at the Ada County 
Courthouse, /\da County Prosecutor, James E. Risch intered and interviev,ed him 
vJithout counsels presence, and coerced him, threatening him "That if You don't 
pleacl guilty tocay, to First Degree Murder, I'r., going to make sure you get the 
death penalty." If the tape v1as off sometimes, and not all conversations v;ere 
tapped, the reality that this coercion took place is a clear possibility. That 
clair.m that it took place on the date of the plea of not guilty, flarch 23, 1972, 
at the Ada County Courthouse, is a very real possibility, and can be checked from 
the records. However, the former prosecutor, now Senator Jim Risch, has recently 
stated in a public interview: (IDAHO STATESMAN Monday November 4, 2013 Page AB) 
"Ron r1acik 1vas probably one of the iJorst guys I ever 
prosecuted," the Republican lawmaker said last week. "He 1·1as 
a bad, bac person." But the suggestion he climbed the 
Depression-era courthouse's steps toots top-floor jail cells 
to pressure Macik into a guilty plea is pure fiction, the 
Republican lav1maker said. "I did not visit inmates in the Ada 
County Jail, for obvious reasons," Risch said. "I vwuld have 
been disbarred for contacting a client represented by an 
attorney. I remer.iber that I did not do that." 
rlr. naci k points out that on page 196 of the transcripts the Sheriff states 
he does not turn the tape off v1hen i nterroga ting. Hov1ever, on page 166 line 1-
5, he state he doesn't tape sometimes, and again on page 174, line 4 thru 11 he 
states he doesn't tape sometimes. And on pages 183 thru 183 he claims he has no 
memory of ahy conversations while the tape is off. As to fir. f1aci k being 
interrogated by officials without counsel, Macik submits the following portion of 
the Preliminary hearing transcripts. 
7 
PRELir1HJARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT, pages 195 thru 196; Transcript pages -201- & 
-202-; RC-000216; 000217): 
Line 6: Q Sheriff, again calling your attention to that statement, you 
wi 11 note I believe on page 2 or page 3 that prior to Mr. 
Macik making any "incriminating" statments he flat out said 
"I 1•1ant a lawyer." Hhy did you proceed after he made that 
request? 
A Because he said, "I needn't and I already have one, Mr. 
Redford. 
"Right. 
"Now that you stated that you did want to talk to me? 
"Yeah. 
"In other vrnrds, you are here at your request, not mine? 
"No, it's more complicated than that. There's a lot to it. I 
never talked to my attorney about it because it never came up 
before." 
Q At that point in time or any time during that particular 
evening did you in fact attempt to contact an attorney on 
behalf of Mr. Macik? 
A No, Sir. 
Q v/hy not? 
/1, He didn't ask for an attorney. That is, he didn't ask for a 
specific attorney. it's recorded here, each thing that he 
said. 
The Appellant, Ronald Lee Macik, submitted all the evidence above, along with 
an actual innocence claim, in each of his attempts to seek justice with the state 
courts. Furthermore, the Clerks Record indicates that in the original case, on 
March 9, and March 30, 1972 he both submittedf motions and requested examination 
and appearnace for mental Defect. Macik also submitted a Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal on Grounds of Mental Defect on September 8, 1972 and it was denied on 
that same day. 
Macik 1vas in fact at the ,,da County Courthouse on August 31, 1972, and in 
fact was met by former prosecutor James E. Risch, without counsel, and that after 
that meeting, and on the same day, he v,ent in and plead guilty to First Degree 
Murder. Even though, he, knew we1Las the Prosecutor,that he was not guilty of it. 
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Mr. Macik points out that the Preliminary hearing Transcript testimony of 
prison officials stipulates that the body of the deceased was found rolled up in a 
gym mat, at the southwest area of the boxing arena, (TT-page 49 thru 51), which is 
just south of the shov1er area, vJhi ch is located on the v1est wa 11 of the area. The 
door with the window and curtain, that Macik moved out of the way and was seen by 
the officer, is on the north wall. (TT-page 42 line 10 thru 15). 
Testimony verifies that when Macik opened the door, the officer seen four or 
five inmates coming out together from the shower area, opposite the door on the 
other side of the room, and those inmates blocked his view from seeing the 
rolled-up gym mat, behind them. Macik v,as the one vJhom opened the door, by 
himself, and had just looked through the vvindow before he opened the door, vJhen 
the officer knocked, and was seen by the officer doing so. (See above references). 
To put it plainly! flr. Macik vJas at the door when the officer tried the 
door handle and realized it was locked from the inside, and when he knocked, Macik 
v1as the one who looked out the vJi ndow, and the one who opened the door after 
telling the others that their i·1as a screw at the door. Or, "The Screws here." 
Screw being the term prisoner's often use to describe a prison cop or officer. 
Macik was not in the shower area, nor near the mat, nor did he have any blood 
on him. No weapon or fingerprints or evidence was ever produced to establish that 
Macik took a physical part in the murder, other than him accompanying Butler to 
the boxing arena area, as Butler was accustomed to demanding from others. 
The court minutes (See: Attachment #12 & #13), indicate that Macik never gave 
direct evidence that he actually killed Butler. Furthermore, at the plea hearing 
as v1ell as all hearings, including the preliminary hearing, Mr. Macik v1as under 
forced administration of medication (Thorzine) by the prison officials, due in 
part to the court order to have him evaluated for mental defect. He v1as in no 
instance, cognitive mentally, or knowingly a participant. And only through threat. 
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The trial court in this instant case, as we 11 as those cases preceedi ng this 
one, has ta 1<en judicial notice of the underlying criminal record, the preliminary 
hearing transcripts, as well as those affidavits, letters, and record relevant to 
the case. The Idaho Court of Appeals and Idaho Supreme Court has done so as well. 
These facts as related above are properly before the court, were submitted in 
full through excerpts of the transcripts to the district court belovJ, multiple 
times. 
The Appellant has and does submit Factual, Admissible Evidence, and a 
colorable claim of Innocence. Hm,,ever, the question consitently raised by the 
court, is whether Macik is barred, not 1,hether he is innocent. Those facts 1vhich 
point to his innocence, are overlooked, while at the same time, the court and the 
state suggest that there are no facts in dispute, 11hen in fact there are. r1acik 
has not been provided any evidentiary hearing at any time. He has also been denied 
an effective amendment or post-conviction presentation. /\tall times relevant to 
these proceedings, P1r. r1acik has been unable, due to mental defect to present his 
case In Propri a persona. He has consitently been at the mercy of the court to 
propound that his npleadings be converted and amended properly, 11hich they have 
not. .~s the statment of the Course of the Proceedings (belov,) viill show, the only 
time any counsel appointer amended anything, they simply submited a tv10 page 
post-conviction with no law or authority or conversion whatsoever, and one page of 
the petition v1as in fact the certificate of service. Counsel simply did as riacik 
had been doin0, su~mitting petition and motion after motion and petition, 
attaching his letters and affidavit and excerpts of the transcripts to it. On each 
occasion, tl1e court assignecl a nevJ case number, as 11ell as the appeals court, and 
renied any aclequate processes. ,,no cor:ipletely overlooked any application of an 
actual innocence standard of review, even though riacik asserted such at the onset, 
and federalized his claim with authority. 
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COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The recorr, i nri cates a nurc'er case filing on ;~.ugust ll!, 1971. the foll m1i ng 
r.1ont'.1 on Septeml':ler 21'tl1 anr ?5th, 1'?71 Transcrihed interrogation tapes are r.iade 
anr sut:lmitted by tl1e ,Ar.a County Prosecutor, James E. Risch and Sheriff Paul 
flrigl1t. four cays 12-ter a cor.iplaint is filer on Septer.1ber 29, 1S71 f-iased on a 
brea~ in the case by t~e confession of nanny Powers. ~ preliminary hearing is held 
anc con+.inuer on :lovemrier 23, 1S7l at 11hich tir.;e Risch requested ann the court 
0rantcd a request to excluce the Press anr the Public frora the proceecings. 
On February 25, 1S72, anot!1er prelir,iinary hearing 11as conductec', at \1hic:1 
tine it 1·:as transcriber ancl transferred along 1.,ith the affidavits and supporting 
interroaation tapes and evicence. On f1arch ?, 1972 the parties v1ere arraigned in 
cistrict court. On t::2 Sth of r:arch, 197? notice \1as given of nental refect of the 
cefenrant Ronalc' Lee r:aci 1(, anc' a motion \Jas filer in that regare' on march 3C, 
JC'7?. f:otion for c'efcnse of mental rlefect v,as 2ventually renier 'riy t 11e court. 
f'.0.ci'< plear not 0uilty along v1ith cefenr\rnt 1/illiar.i f3urt, on f1arc!1 ?3, E'7?. 
Gn ~nril ?1, 197? the court orrerer a mental exar.1 of defenrlant f:aci'<. f\::cik har 
iJ.lrea(y been ;)lac2r on Thorzin 'riy prison officials after tl1e riot the pr2vious 
year. P1e mental healti1 exa;:1 anr report vms subr.iittec t 1une 5, lS72 and flacik iJas 
orrerec' to stanr trial. r1acik's counsel ahd submitted evirence of maci'<'s nental 
:1ealth issues gains back to childhoor, and his placement in a r.iental health 
institution, to iJit, Torrance State Hospital in Pennsylvania \Jhen l1e 1,as a child, 
as ivell as correctional institution for juveniles. The court risregard these 
reports, anc' also rid not take t!1em or flaciks ability to co;:;pr::::!1enc! the 
proceecings heino under the influence of induced Thorzine. 
On L1uly 1-7, IS?? a motion \Jas filer anr granted on t1uly 27, 1S72 to have 
r1aci 1< transportec' to tl1e Ira County ~fail, fron segregation anrl isolation at the 
state penitentiary. lie \1as transported on .1\ugust 29, 1972. 
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Three days later, after consultaion with the Ada County Prosecutor, James E. 
Risch, and Sheriff Paul Bright, Macik plead guilty to First Degree Murder after 
v1ithcirawing his plea to avoid the death penalty. Counsel vJas not present during 
negotiations, on August 31, 1972. 
On September 8, 1972 Macik filed a Motion for Judgment of Acquital on Grounds 
of Mental Defect, this motion was denied the same day. The state has refused to 
provide anything more than minutes of the hearings, and no exam report or 
evaluation done at the time of the courts denials. 
On September 13, 1972 Danny powers plead guilty to the actual murder of Bill 
Butler and gave account on record that he was in fact the murderer. On that same 
clay, a verdict of guilty v1as entered against Powers and Macik both. Macik and 
P0v1ers v1ere ':}oth also sentenced. Maciksentenced, September 14, 1972 to life in 
prison for first degree murder, and the ~udgment was filed. Powers same on the 21st 
1972. William Burt plead guilty to 2nd degree murder on October 19, 1972, and was 
sentenced to 30 years. Judgment entered the next day October 20, 1972. Appeal was 
taken for Pmvers, and transcripts v,1ere completed and served June 28, 1972. Macik 
was never given an appeal, direct or otherwise. 
On December 3rd, 1972, two months after pleading guilty, and after the time 
for filing a direct appeal had passed, and all the ~·,hile being held in isolation 
and segregation at the Idaho State pen south of Boise, Idaho. Macik was 
transferred to a federal penitentiary in Lewisburg, P/\. \·Jhere he remained until 
released on parole the first time. 
Macik first contacted the /\da County court and Public Defenders office in 
t!uly and ,~ugust of 199/1 in an attempt to obtain records of his conviction and 
sentence in order to address the manifest injustice of his conviction and 
sentence. Few records were provided. And no transcripts at all. 
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Based on Macik 's failure to obtain any records of substance concerning his 
case he resigned himself to his fate. Fifteen years later, 11acik came upon 
co-defendant Danny Powers, whom informed him that he had in fact admitted to the 
murder, gave evidence and account of the same on record, and promised to provide 
Macik with parts of the relevant transcript of the preliminary hearing. 
After receiving further evidence concerning his innocence on record, Macik 
sent a letter first, and than a Petition For \tlri t of Habeas Corpus to the Ada 
county Court, requesting special proceedings regarding an actual innocence claim. 
District Court case number CV-HC-2011-08579. The court denied service to 
respondents and dismissed the petition outright. Daniel C. Hurlbutt Jr. presiding. 
Order of Dismissal filed on June 2, 2011. On June 28, 2011 Macik filed a Motion to 
Reconsider appointment of counsel on appeal, after filing his Notice of Appeal 
timely on June 15, 2011. Macik also sought clarification of the order of 
dismissal. The court issued an Order Re: Motions on July 19, 2011 clarifying its 
position on habeas Corpus in Idaho not being a remedy for appeal. The disregarded 
Maciks actual innocence claim altogether. 
On appeal, S.Ct. Docket Mo. 38908-2011, the Supreme Court issued an order 
Conditionally Dismissing Appeal. July 28, 201l: "appears not to be v1arranted by 
exisitn lav1, as required under I.,ll..R., 11.2." Macik was given 21 days to respond. 
he did so with an Objection to Order, requesting reconsideration. Making a federal 
claim and asserting actual innocence, on August 9, 2011. On August 29, 2011 the 
Court issued an order Dismissing Appeal of Application for Writ Of Habeas Corpus. 
The grounds given were the same as in the original order. "Not warranted by 
existing law." Remittitur issued September 21, 2011. There being no remedy in lavJ 
Petitioner Maci~ filed his documents and requests for justice in the Idaho Federal 
District Court. Case No. 1:94-CV-503-BLW. The Petition was dismissed claiming lack 
of jurisdiction. Petitioner t-1acik submitted again, Case No. 1:08-CV-00360-EJL. 
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This time, the Federal Court denied relief on the grounds that r1acik had failed to 
get authorization from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to 
file a successive petition. The Court ordered that the clerk provide Petitioner 
vJith a successive petitions form to be filed with the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, on December 6, 2013. (See: /\ttachment #14). 
Petitioner r1acik submitted his application to the Ninth Circuit and the Court 
of /\_ppeals issued an Order in Case t!o. 13-71t359, on February 27, 201.1., declaring 
that it \Jas unnecessary for successive petition. Ordering that "If petitioner 
files a habeas petition in the district court c11allenging l1is 1972 conviction, 
petitioner shall provide the district court with a copy of this order." (See: 
Order in RONALD LEE f1ACIK V. JASON ELLIS, NO. 13-74359: Attachment #15). 
In the interm, riacik had filed a request to the /\da County District Court in 
the form of a letter on f1arch 14, 2011. This action vJas submitted using the 
previous case no. 4949, and \vas refiled by the court as CRFE-1971-4949, and the 
court appointed counsel, and the action was designated a r1otion To Hithdraw Guilty 
Plea. On September?, 2011 Honorable Judge Copsey cienied the r1otion pursuant to a 
lack of jurisciiction claim. Counsel at no time amenced the claims. flacik appealed 
through the /\ra County Public Defenders office, September 28, 2011. The State 
Appellate Public Defendaers office vJas assigned, Docket Mo. 39233. An Appellant's 
Rrief was prepared, on the grounds of a manifest injustice. (See: Attachment #16); 
The Iraho Court of 1~ppeals affirmed the dismissal and issued its Order may 24, 
201?.. Docket tlo. 39233. (See: J\ttachment #17). 1~ Remittitur vJas issued June 12, 
20J.2. ,A Petition For Revie\J 11as filed ,June 6, 2012, on BRIEFS ALREADY FILED, and 
The Idaho Supreme Court denied the petition June 11, 2012. (See: Attachment #18). 
r1aci'< than comriiled his letters, elated 1994; L1une 9, 2009; r1arch 14, and 
/\pril ?011; /1nd crafted a VERIFIED f10TIOt! TO REOPEtl Cl\SE 8/\SED Otl MEI/LY DISCOVERED 
EVIDEnCE REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARit!G, detailing out his claims.(Attachment #4) 
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f1acik fecieralized his /\ffidavit vlith Strickland v. Hashington, 466 U.S. 688 
(1984); and Brady v. f1aryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966); and U.S. v. howard, 381 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2004); and Dziurgot v. 
Luther, 897 F.2d 1222 (1st Cir. 1990); and Lopez v. U.S., 439 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 
1971). Macik also asserted an actual innocence claim and violations of his 5th; 
6th; and 14th Amendment rights, argued res judicata under I.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)(4); 
and submitted genuine issues of material fact in dispute, clearly. Macik also 
argued that pursuant to Hest v. Statye, 123 Idaho 250 (1993), that the fact he was 
suffering from forced induced Thorzin medication, his guilty plea v,as 
inadmissable. And therefore his action was reviewable under a manifest injustice 
standard of review, along with an actual innocence standard. Macik's Affidavit is 
part of the record in this case. This action was filed by Macik in his previous 
action and appeal under case no. CR-FE-1971-0004949. Judge Copsey excepted the 
Affidavit which was accompanyined by a Motion For Counsel, and assigned counsel on 
October 24, 2012, using the same case numher of the previous case. This action was 
considered a Motion For A tlew Trial by the state and they filed an Objection on 
Novemhver 30, 2012, in which they attached the minutes from the original criminal 
case showing Macik plead guilty, without evidence of any actual detailed admission 
or account of the crime as defendant Danny powers had done. 
Macik virote counsel a number of times, requesting proper amendments and 
action in the cqse. (See: A.ttachment #19). And Macik v,rote to the court, judge 
Copsey, Received in Chambers, May 28, 2013 asking for counsel to be ordered to 
v1ithdraw or do their job. (See: Attachment #20). /\ hearing vJas conducted adfter 
the case was designated REOPOlED December J.8, 2012. On january 16, 2013, Judge 
Copsey denied the Motion For a new Trial after a Telephonic hearing. /\ transcript 
was ordered prepared, January 23, 2013. 
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On c]uly 26, 2012 Macik filed a petition for Post-Conviction relief. r1acik 
submitted his actual innocence claim along with an affidavit asserting the 
circumstances surrounding his guilty plea. Case ~lo. CV-PC-2012-13953. The same 
court, Judge Copsey presiding, dismissed the petition outright on August 27, 2012. 
maci'< appealed. In Idaho court of /1.ppeals Docket No. <'10321-2012. the Idaho Court 
of Appeals issued an opinion on October 21'-, 2013, ruling that macik should have 
been given a chance to amend his petition in response to the states request to 
summary dismissal. The case was remanded for further proceedings. (See Unpublished 
opinion flo. 722; docket t!o. t1032l)(Attahcment #21). 
On rer;iancl, r1acik submitted to the district an Jlffidavit, Docket tlo. 40321, 
and requested counsel also, dated November 6, 2013. Docket No. ~1705 RC-000005 
thru OCOCOfi r OOOOOA. (See: Attachment #9 & Attachment #10) 
In case CV-PC-2012-13953 on remand, the district court denied counsel; 
RC-COOOlO Case No. ~1705. In doing so the court attached copies of Maciks letters, 
and institutional transfer record from federal prison. The court also included a 
ROA Report from Case tlo. CR-FE-1971-0004949 RC-000039-40. 
On December 10, 2013 Judge Copsey Conditionally dismissed f1aci'<'s petition. 
the court neither attached 11acik 's Verified 1\ffi davit, nor took into account his 
nevi Affidavit in support. The court did take judicial notice of the preliminary 
hearing transcripts, ancl Macik's guilty plea. RC-000045. The court dismissed the 
petition January 7, 20lt1, after nacik filed a Notice of Appeal in the case on 
December 17, 2013. CV-PC-13953. RC-000072 . 
. ~.t no time in the district courts analysis die' ~'ud0e copsey apply an actual 
innocence standard of review, or Petitioner's issues in that context. Furthermore, 
the court completely disregarded riacik's inahility and mental deficiencies in that 
he is unable to comply viith legal requirements of ar.iendments and responses or 
those c'emanc's put on him by the court, in any respect. 
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Junclge Copsey issued her final lludgment on !anuary 7, 2014. f1acik pror:iptly 
filer a ne11 tlotice of /lppeal on case no. CV-PC-13953. · He asserted supplemental 
jursidiction on S.Ct. Docket No. 41705-2013. !lacik requested counsel on appeal and 
the court denier it in an Order Denying /\pp. of Counsel RC-000109 thru RC-000120. 
Order dated February 26, 2014. T!1e court again attached all of r1aci 1<'s letters 
except his Verified r1otion Affidavit and Affidavit in Support of his petition on 
Rer:ianr. Both suhstantially the crux of the case. Judge Copsey corrected her final 
_iurgment on f1arch ?11, 201A v1ith a DISt1ISS/\L \/ITH PREJUDICE, C/\SE tlo. CV-PC-2012 
13953. RS-OCOl/l?-1113. No Transcript of t~e telephonic hearing has been provided as 
requested. 
r1aci'< submitted a notion For Joinder of Docket tlo. 111705-2013 v1itl1 Docket fJo. 
t'.1115/1. Said notion vJas denied. 
Due to the fact that Judge Copsey refused to take L1 udi ci al t!oti ce of i1aci k's 
Verified f1otion To Reopen Case Based on Nev1ly Discovered Eviclence Request For 
Evidentiary Hearing, (See: Docket tlo. 111154, RC-000005 thru 000011), or the 
/\ffidavit In Support of his Remanded petition, Docket tlo. 41705, RC-000005-6 Si 
Request for counsel RC-000008, Docket No. 41705 t Remand 40371). f1acik submitted a 
Successive Petition filed February 12, 2013. Case No. CV-PC-2013-02644. 
In this current action Lluclge Copsey ordered no anendments, and orders the 
state to respond no later than April 1, 2013. See: Schecluling Orrer For Successive 
Petiion, dated February 20, 2013. RC-000013. The Petition v1as in fact already 
amended hy Attorney D. Davin Lorello, 2r. the same clay of flacik's filing, February 
12, 2n13. however, this is a two page amdnement, without aut!1ority or citations or 
conformance to the UPCPA. See: RC-000003-A. This Petition is one page, two if you 
count the certificate of service. f1acik's Verified /\fficlavit is attached. Copsey 
rloes make note of r1acik's /1.ctual Innocence claim in her Scheduling Order. 
RC-000013-14. 
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The state filed their Supplemental Motion To Dismiss and Request for judicial 
rlotice of the entire underlying criminal case. It should be noted that the state 
relied on its Objection To Motion For new Trial, filed in case 
CR-FE-1971-0004949, filed November 30, 2012 as their argument to deny petitioner 
the right to amend, and asked that it be incorporated therein. RC-000015 thru 
RC-000019, filed February 20, 2013. Casello. CV-PC-2013-02644, Docket No. 41154. 
The district Court Judge Copsey, Dismissed the Successive petition in case 
CV-PC-2013-02644 on May 14, 2013. Macik timely appealed on June 26, 2013 through 
the Ada County Public Defenders Office. Same counsel, D. Dave Lorello. 
The State Appellate public Defenders Office was appointed and promptly moved 
for withdraw, filing a Motion For Leave To Withdraw on December 19, 2013, 
accompanyied by an Affidavit and Memorandum. Macik 's .Actual Innocence claim was 
completely ciisregarded, as well as his evidence supporting the claim. 
Macik filed an Objection to counsels withdraw, and moved to strike counsels 
statements as prejudicial to the Appellant's case, on January 17, 2014. The Suprem 
Court granted counsels motion to withdraw. Appellants moved to suspend the 
briefing schedule until either counsel could be obtained or reappointed. This 
motion was granted for 35 days. 
On may 20, 2014 the Appellant Ronald Lee Macik filed a Motion To suspend the 
Briefing Schedule until transcripts and record could be obtained that hereforeto 
has not been provided to the Appellant, including the transcripts of the 
telephonic hearings. And Motion For Joinder of the two Appeals Docket No. 41154 
and Docket Mo. Li1705. These motions vJere denied and the Supreme Court ordered 
briefing on the present case Docket No. 41154-2013 to be submitted no later than 
14 days from May 27, 2014. Therefore, the Appellant submits the following 
argument and authority in support of his actual innocence claim in order to 
exhaust and comply with Ninth Circuit Order Mo. 13-74359. Attached as #14 & #15. 
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ISSUE ot!E 
THE DISTRJCT c:rUPT ERRED IN rnsmssrnc rm. f'.;~CIK'S SUCCESSIVE PETITiotl 
l!ITHOUT /IPPLYit 1r Ptl ''CTL'/\L H!f!QCDJCE STAt!Dr,RD C'F REVIE\!. 
/1,RGUflEtlT 
T'1e /lppellant 11as subr,1ittec that his court appointee counsel, and every 
counsel appointer since his conviction has been ineffective and in fact 
conspiratorial in nature, hy sup;:iorting the stat2s ;;osition to convict anr ,''.'.:ny 
ap;)cllate processes. the record indicates that counsel has done nothing to either 
protect appellants rights or ~et to the truth of this case. Consistent complaints 
to t~e court in this regard ~ave ,rent unheadec1 completely, and nost often, counsel 
~as heen renied altogether. 
H:e United States <:uprer:1e Court has ':el c that: ~ rroc:x'urally rlefaulted 
ineffective-assistance claim can serve as cause to excuse the procedural default 
of another 11a'")eas clair:1 only if t'.1e :10.heas petition2r can s&tisfy th2 "cause and 
pre:urice" stancarcl 11it:1 respect to t'.1e ir.effoctive-assistance clair:i itsr,::lf. T'12 
procerural d2fault c'octrine anc' its attencant "cause anr ;:ire_:iudic:::" standarci Jr,:: 
rroundcr in comity anc1 federalisr.; conc2rns, Coler,1an v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 
73(', and apply \/1et 11er t!1e cefault occurrer at trial, on appeal, or on state 
collateral 2ttac 1<, f1urray v. Carrier, 1177 u. s. ACf'\-,!lO? ·,-'\.) .•• '! • CoL:nsel 's 
ineffec+iveness in failing properly to preserve a clair.1 for state-court revi2\1 
uill sufice as eut:s0, hut only if t!1at ineffectiveness itself constitutes an 
i nrepenc'ent constitutional clailii. Carrier, su;;ra, at 
Jneffcctive-assistancve cl2.ims served as cause to excuse the cefault of the 
sufficicncy-of-t 11c-evir'ence clain, \/1et'12r or not the forner cl2ir.1 i~c.r '>c2n 
rrocec'ura 11 y c'efau1ter, hecause responc1ent 
ineffective-assistance clai~ hy ~resenting ·+ l C, to 
hac 
the state ccurts in his 
a.ppl i cation to reo;;cn +he ci rec7 a:)pea l. Fi nri ns pre,0uri c2 fror.1 counsel's failure 
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to raise the sufficiency-of-the-evic'encc clair.l on c'irect appeal, it cl.irectec the 
nistrict :.ourt to issU(: t'1e 11rit concitionec upon t'le state court's according 
re:sroncent a nevi culpahility hearint;;. See: Er\1arcs v. Car;:ienter, 520 U.S. l:1'16, 1.20 
<;.Ct. 1Sf<7, 1111,;- 1..Ed.?d 518 (?C'CC). L1ustice Scalia reliverec the opinion of the 
Court. 
The ,Apoellant t1as clearly subf.litted letters on r;iultiple occasions to the 
court ahout counsels failL!res ancl refusals to ar.icnd the p2titions. The itself 
attac~er th2se letters tot 11eir c'ecisions ho.rring r2vi211. th2y are a r:-;atte:r of 
recorc' anc therefore, nlainly anc ;Jroperly sui,r.1ittecl as inc'212c'J.nt cli:ir1s to tl12 
state courts. The Gne (l) page ar:1enc'r.1ent itself suffic.2s to point to cow1s2ls 
failures to present ar,pellants claif.ls. 
lppellants colorahle clair:1 of innocence, 2:11c the 2vicenc2 :sta')lishing it, 
were properly hefore the state courts on r:1ultiplc occasions. The failure to resard 
it, souly hasec on procec'ural hars 11as anr is if.1proper. /\~p2llant ar9ues t'.1at a 
crecihle sho11in0 of "actual • II 1nnoccrc::: uncer Sc!l l up v. nelo, S13 U.S. 2sn, 115 
s.ct. 0r1 , 1 7C L.Ec'.?c' rrr /1sr::S), excuses t::e statute of lir1itations r:i2rior 
estaf1lsi'1ec' Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penc1lty ,~ct of JS9c 
( " .I\. ED p A II ) > ~ ??111 ct sec. This 
!:earing to present '1i s evi c'ence, :1ouever, ;1e 11as suf;r.~ittec' enoug'1 2vi e'en cc to 
support his clair.1 altoc-et!1cr, 11itl1out one. 
T~e ~ppellant argues t~at a crerible claiD of actual innocence constitutes an 
equitahle exception to ~EDPA's 1i~itations perioc, anc' a petitioner 11ho ~akes such 
a s!1ovling r.1ay pass t'1roush the SC:1lup cate1Jay anc :1ave :,is otl1crnise tir.1c-:;arr2r 
clair,;s !1eard on t!;c :.1erits in r2cornizinc o.n 2cuita1lt~ exc2ption hascc1 on a 
crcc'ihlc s!1ot1inc of actual inncccnce. See: Lee v. Lar,,hort, G3:? F.:?c1 U70 (St:1 Cir. 
? () J 1 ) ; D at l i no v . I ! arr i son , s .11 ? F . 2 c1 GS? , '.': S' r ( St 11 Ci r . ,? CO r) . 
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The United States Supreme Court has instructed, AEDPA' s statute of 
limitations is subject to equitable exceptions "in appropriate cases." Holland v. 
Florida, U.S._, 130 S.Ct. 2549,2560; Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952,959 (9th 
Cir. 2010). Because ~2244(d) is not jurisdictional, it is "subject to a 
'rebuttable pre'sru1rr1;1rtt:iiarrr' in favor' of equitable tolling.'"Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 
2560(quoting Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89,95-96, 111 S. r3, 
112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990)). 
The actual innocence exception 'serves as an additional safeguard against 
compelling an innocent man to suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty,' 
guarnateei ng that the ends of :usti ce will be served in full." McCl es key v. Zant, 
1189 U.S . .!lr-i7,at 495, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2ci 517 (1991); (quoting Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U.S. 465,4n-93, n. 31, 96 S.Ct. 3037, L19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976)). 
1\s the Court warned in Holland: Id. at 2562. "It is difficLJt to imagine a 
stronger equit2ble claim for keeping open the courthouse doors than one of actual 
innocence. "the ultimate equity on the prisoner's side." Hithrow v. l·Jilliams, 507 
~J.S. 680,7(10. 113 S.Ct. 1745, 123 L.Ed.2d L107 (1993)(0'Connor, J., concurr·"ng in 
part and dissenting in part) (noting that the Supreme Court "continuously has 
recogn 1 z2d tha·t, a sufficient s101r1ing of actual innocence" is norm.:11-y enough, 
"stanc1 1 rq al0:2, to ouh1eigh oUHir concerns and justify adjudir:ation of t'1e 
prisoner's constitutional claim"). IndeerJ, "the in,!ivi,1u21 interrst in avoiding 
injustice is most compelling in the context of actual inncce~r.:::::." Schlup, 513 U.S. 
at 324. 
When Congress codified new rules governing this previously judicially managed 
area of law, it did so wihtout losing sight of the fact that the "vJrit of habeas 
corpus plays a vital role in protecting constitutional rights." it did not seek to 
end every possible delay at all costs. Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562 (quoting Slack 
v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). 
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An actual innocence exception to the limitations provisions does not foster 
abuse or delay, but instead recognizes that in extraordinary cases, the social 
interests of finality, comity, and conserving judicial resources 'must yield to 
the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration." f1urray v. 
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). 
Finally, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance requires us to construe the 
statute, if possible, to avoid a serious constitutional question. See Pub, Citizen 
v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 466, 109 S.Ct. 2558, 105 L.Ed.2d 377 
(1989)("it has long been an axiom of statutory interpretation that where an 
otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional 
problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such 
constrution is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." As our sister circuits 
have observed, denying federal habeas relief from an actually innocent petitioner 
would be "consatitutionally problematic." Souter, 395 F.3d at 601-02 (collecting 
cases); see e.g., vlyzy'<owski v. Dep't of Corr., 226 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th 
Cir.?OOO)(noting that barring a habeas petitioner who can show actual innocence, 
but who filed after AEDP/\'s limitations period, "raises concerns because of the 
inherent injustice that results from the conviction of an innocent person, and the 
technological advances that can provide compelling evidence of a person's 
onnocence." In Schlup, the Supreme Court noted: 
[C]oncern about the injustice that results from the conviction of an innocent 
person has long been at the core of our criminal justice system. That concern is 
reflected, in the "fundamental value determination of our society that it is far 
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." 513 U.S. at 
325 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368(1970) 
(Harlan, J., concurring)). 
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In order to present otherwise time-barred claims to a federal habeas court 
under Schlup, a petitioner must produce sufficient proof of his actual innocence 
to bring him "within the 'narrow class of cases . implicating a fundamental 
miscarriage of justice.'" 513 U.S. at 314-15 (quoting r1cCleskey, 499 U.S. at 494). 
the evidence of innocence must be "so strong that a court cannot have confidence 
in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was 
free of nonharmless constitutional error." Id. at 316. 
To pass through the Schlup gateway, a "petitioner must show that it is more 
li~ely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of 
the new evidence." Id. at 327; house, 547 U.S. at 538. This exacting standard 
"permits review only in the extraordinary' case," but it does not require absolute 
certainty about the petitioner's guilt or innocence." House, 547 U.S. at 538 
(quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). /\s we have previously said, "where 
post-conviction evidence casts doubt on the conviction by undercutting the 
reliability of the proof of guilt, but not by affirmatively proving innocence, 
that can be enough to pass through the Schlup gateway to allow consideration of 
otherwise barred claims." Sistrun'< v. /\rmenakis, 292 F.3d 669, 673 (9th Cir. 
2002)(en banc)(citing Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 478-79 (9th Cir. 1997)(en 
bane)). 
Sehl up requires a petitioner "to support his a 11 ega ti ons of cons ti tuti ona l 
error with new reliable evidence--whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, 
trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence--that was not 
presentedf at trial." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. The habeas court then "consider[s] 
all the evidence, old and new, incriminating and exculpatory," admissible at trial 
or not. House, 547 U.S. at 538 (internal quotation mar'<s omitted); Carriger, 132 
F.3d at 477-78. On this complete record, the court ma'<es a"'probabilistic 
determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do."' House, 
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547 U.S. at 538 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329). 
The Appe 11 ant submits that he has produced just such evidence. tlot only 
material evidence that he was not a partaker in the murder itself, but also, that 
another person, at the time of the murder admitted to authorities that he was the 
one who committed the crime. Other individuals that may or may not have been 
i n v o l v e d a t the ti me , are not rel e v a n t to /\ p p e l l a n ts c l a i m . I t i s on l y rel e van t 
that the Appellant was not the murderer, was incapaciated at the time of his plea, 
both mentally, and through coercion. And that fear alone played a part in pleading 
guilty. The petitioner/Appellant submitted this evidence as soon as it was 
available to him, albeit, in unorthadox methods, but submitted as an Affidavit, 
with colorable admissible evidence, as is nrequired by the UPCPA, and the AEDPA's 
requirements. flultiple times! (See: Course of the Proceedings, above). 
The Appellant points out that although another prisoner had confessed to the 
crime, which is sometimes suspect by authorities in cases like this, it was done 
early in the case, without the full avJarnesses of the Appellant. However, the 
witnesses testimony that establishes that the Appellant was on the other side of 
the room at the time of the murder and involvment of multiple other individuals, 
was an Idaho State Correctional Officer, who's testimony vJas not than nor now, 
challenged. If the state does not want to believe a convict, than surely they must 
regard the testimony of one of their own. A boxing arena was in between the 
appellant and the incident. Mot something you can jump around or move through very 
quickly. Certainly not when f1acik moved the curtain to see who was there the 
moment the officer knocked on the door, as testified to. This coupled with the 
admission from another prisoner to the crime, is colorable evidence of innocence. 
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ISSUE TWO 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT MR. MACIK'S PLEA WAS KNOWING 
WILLING, AND WITHOUT DURESS. 
ARGUMENT 
The Appellant has shown that not only was his mental capacities in question 
well prior to incarceration in Idaho in 1969. It was in question at the time of 
the murder, and at the time of the trial (preliminary hearing) on the matter, he 
was committed within the prison system itself, isolated, and force medicated with 
Thorzine, which ensued during all proceedings, at the time of his plea, and even 
at sentencing and even transfer to a federal facility after sentencing. While the 
court ordered evaluations, it would appear that it was only effectual for forcing 
medication upon the Appellant, not for evaluation of his ability to stand trial, 
or even be fully aware of the proceedings and what they meant. The record is clear 
on this. No actual mental evaluation has been provided to the Appellant from any 
records within the state of Idaho. 
Mr. Macik submits his argument from The United Staters Supreme court case: 
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). The Supreme 
Court, justice Marshall, held that when a defendant has made a preliminary showing 
that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at 
trial, due process requires that a state provide access to a psychiatrist's 
assistance on the issue, if a defendant cannot otherwise afford one. 
As the State conceded at oral argument in Ake, federal constitutional errors 
are "fundamental." Tr. of oral Arg. 51-52; see Buchanan v. State, 523 P.2d 1134, 
1137 (Okla.Crim.App.1974)(violation of constitutional right constitutes 
fundamental error); see also Williams v. State, 658 P.2d 499 (Okla.Crim.App.1983). 
Thus the State has made application of the procedural bar depend on an antecedent 
ruling on federal law, that is, on the determination of whether federal 
constitutional error has been committed. Before applying the waiver doctrine to a 
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constitutional question, the state court must rule, either explicitly or 
implicitly, on the merits of the constitutional question. 
As the Court indicated in the past, when resolution of the state procedural 
law question depends on a federal constitutional ruling, the state-law prong of 
the court's holding is not independent of federal law, and our jurisdiction is not 
precluded. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126, 65 S.Ct. 459, 463, 89 L.Ed. 
789 ( 1945) ( "We are not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the same 
judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of 
Federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion"); 
Enterprise Irrigation District v. Farmers Mutual Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164, 37 
S.Ct. 318, 320, 61 L.Ed. 644 (1917)("But where the non-Federal ground is so 
interwoven with the other as not to be an independent matter, or is not of 
sufficient breadth to sustain the judgment without any decision of the other, our 
jurisdiction is plain"). In such a case, the federal law holding is integral to 
the state court's disposition of the matter, and our ruling on the issue is in no 
respect advisory. In this case, the additional holding of the state court-that 
the cons ti tuti ona l cha 11 enge presented here was waived-depends on the court's 
federal-law ruling and consequently does not present an independent state ground 
for the decision rendered. The Court therefore turned to a consideration of the 
merits of Ake's claim. 
"This Court has long recognized that when a State brings its judicial power 
to bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take steps to 
assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his defense. this 
elementary principle, grounded in significant part on the Fourteenth Amendment's 
due process guarantee of fundamental fairness, derives from the belief that 
justice cannot be equal where, simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is 
denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in 
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which his liberty is at stake. In recognition of this right, this Court held 
almost 30 years ago that once a State offers to criminal defendants the 
opportinuty to appeal their cases, it must provide a trial transcript to an 
indigent defendant if the transcript is necessary to a decision on the merits of 
the appeal. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956). 
Since then, this Court has held that an indigent defendant may not be required to 
pay a fee before filing a notice of appeal of his conviction, Burns v. Ohio, 360 
U.S. 252, 79 S.Ct. 1164, 3 L.Ed.2d 1209 (1959), that an indigent defendant is 
entitled to the assistance of counsel at trial, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 779 (1963), and on his first direct appeal as of 
right, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963), 
and that such assistance must be effective. See Evitts v. lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 105 
S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Mcmann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 105 S.Ct. 1087, 
84 L.Ed.2d 53, 53 usu~ 4179 759,771, n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449, n. 14, 25 L.Ed.2d 
763 91970). Indeed, in Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 2202, 68 L.Ed.2d 
627 (1981)." 
"Meaningful access to justice has been the consistent theme of these cases. He 
recognized long ago that mere access to the courthouse doors does not by itself 
assure a proper functioning of the adversary process, and that a criminal trial is 
fundamentally unfair if the state proceeds against an indigent defendant without 
making certain that he has access to the raw materials integral to the building of 
an effective defense. Thus, while the Court has not held that a State must 
purchase for the indigent defendant all the assistance that his wealthier 
counterpart might buy, see Ross v. moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 41 
L.Ed.2d 341 (1974), it has often reaffirmed that fundamental fairness entitles 
indigent defendants to "an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly 
within the adversary system." id., at 61Ji 94 S.Ct., at 2444. To implement this 
principle, we have focused on identifying the "basic tools of an adequate defense 
or appeal," Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227, 92 S.Ct. 432, 433, 30 
L.Ed.2d 400 (1971), and we have required that such tools be provided to those 
defendants who cannot afford to pay for them." 
"To say that these basic tools must be provided is, of course, merely to 
begin our inquiry. In this case we must decide whether, and under what conditions, 
the participation of a psychiatrist is important enough to preparation of a 
defense to require the State to provide an indigent defendant with access to 
competent psychiatric assistance in preparing the defense. Three factors are 
relevant to this determination. The first is the private interest that will be 
affected by the action of the State. The second is the governmental interest that 
will be affected if the safeguard is to be provided. The third is the probable 
value of the additional or substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, and 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards 
are not provided. See little v. Streater, supra, 452 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. at 
2205; mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 
(1976) • II 
The Court has discussed the role that due process has played in such cases, 
and the separate but related inquiries that due process and equal protection must 
trugger. See: Evitts v. lucey; Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 
76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983). See also Reilly v. Barry, 250 N.Y. 456, 461, 166 N.E. 
165, 167 (1929)(Cardozo, C.J.)("[UJpon the trial of certain issues, such as 
insanity or forgery, experts are often necessary both for prosecution and for 
defense ... [A] defendant may be at an unfair disadvantage, if he is unable because 
of poverty to parry by his own witnesses the thrust of those against him"). 
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Mr. Macik was not of sound mind nor represented properly while being 
interrogated by multiple officials. furthermore, it was conducted in violation of 
his right to have counsel present. his request for counsel was clearly ignorred 
and violated by the Sheriff's own admission under sworn testimony on record. 
Mr. Macik was in fact confronted by prosecutor James Risch, at the county 
courthouse on the day of his plea, and the idea that the prosecutor never went to 
see prisoners at the county jail, ever, is wholly without believability. It is 
exactly what prosecutors do, only usually it is done in the presence of counsel. 
The truth on file, clearly stipulates, by witnesses under oath, that Macik 
did not take part in the murder of Bill Butler. He was by the door, not over where 
the murder was obviously taking place. Furthermore, it is well established that of 
the five or six men that were at the location of the murder, right next to the gym 
mat, and coming out of the shower area, at least one of them admittitably 
confessed to the actual stabbing and murder of Bill Butler. Danny Powers! 
When the fact that Mr. Macik was under psyciatrice evaluation, under the 
influence of induced Thorzin, was a registered mental patient with known mental 
defects, and was both questioned and coerced outside the presence of his counsel, 
and the Sheri ff, Paul Bright, Prosecutor, James Risch, and Warden of the prison, 
Randa 11 Mays, a 11 had a lot to explain, if the fact that they had chosen a known 
documented Sodomite at the prison to be their spokesman during and after the riot, 
had been made public, it is easy to see and understand the importance of the 
officials need to 'exclude the public and the press,' demand all those charged 
'plead guilty and be sentenced quickly,' and than 'transferred out of state those 
whom had knowledge of the issues being muffled. Maci k is innocent, pursuant to 
justice and factually innocent pursuant to the truth. He deserves adjudication, 
not another cover-up and sufferab le procee'di ngs. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons as stated above, Mr. macik requests that this Court 
reverse his conviction and remand this matter for a new trial. 
In the alternative, and in the interests of justice, determine Mr. Macik is 
innocent of the crime as charged and convicted, order time served, and order his 
release from incarceration. 
bDATED Thi s.J.!lt.day of ..JJ.JAIIJ , 2014. 
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